those convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime.

There are no voting restrictions because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry in Ohio; nor does Ohio require literacy tests prior to voting.

Proposed Federal provision: In elections involving the Presidency and other Federal offices, no voter can be barred because of immaterial errors in registration applications, and the same standards must apply to all applicants.

The bill would create the assumption that any person who has completed the sixth grade shall be deemed literate enough to vote and stipulates that all literacy tests be written unless the applicant requests otherwise.

It would speed disposal of discrimination suits by authorizing the Attorney General or any defendant to request that a three-judge district court be convened to hear the suit. An appeal would go directly to the Supreme Court.

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

Ohio: Under a 1961 amendment to the State Fair Employment Practices Act, there are fines up to $500 and imprisonment up to 90 days or both for denial of public accommodations because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.

Enforcement is by the State civil rights commission, which acts on receipt of any sworn charge. The procedure involves investigation, conferences, conciliation attempts, and persuasion before public hearing and formal order.

Proposed Federal: All persons shall have access without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin to hotels and places of lodging (except those having five or fewer rooms for rent), eating establishments, places of amusement, gasoline stations, and any place segregated by State of local law.

Private clubs are exempt except when their facilities are made available to customers of one of the hotels, restaurants, or other places mentioned above.

Aggrieved persons themselves or the Attorney General may bring action against violations. The latter would be compelled to seek corrective action from State or local agencies before going to court.

Contempt cases arising from failure to comply with court orders could result in fines and imprisonment. The Attorney General also would be authorized to file suits to ban discrimination in public facilities such as parks and libraries.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Ohio: The State's last school segregation law was repealed in 1886, and the courts have enjoined local boards from assigning Negro children to all-Negro schools.

Proposed Federal: The bill would authorize the Commissioner of Education and the Attorney General to assist the States in desegregation of schools. The latter would be authorized to institute civil actions to desegregate if voluntary measures failed.

The education commissioner could conduct surveys, supply technical assistance to school authorities, issue grants for hiring and training personnel to deal with desegregation problems, and sponsor university institutes for training teachers to handle those problems.

As approved by the House, the bill specifically prohibits action under this program to shift schoolchildren to correct racial imbalance.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Ohio: The Civil Rights Commission may create advisory agencies at the local level to foster better community relations. There are local community relations agencies in Toledo, Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus.

Proposed Federal: The bill would create a Community Relations Service in the Department of Commerce to assist States and cities to solve difficulties arising from racial friction.

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

Ohio: The Ohio commission has been in existence since 1959, administering the Fair Employment and Public Accommodations Acts as well as conducting educational and research programs.

Proposed Federal: The bill would extend the life of the Federal Commission for 4 years and give it additional authority to serve as a clearinghouse for information. A House amendment barred the Commission from investigating membership policies of private clubs and fraternal groups.

PUBLIC PROGRAMS

Ohio: Since 1935, Ohio has barred discriminatory practices by contractors and subcontractors dealing with the State or its subdivisions.

Proposed Federal: Government agencies would be authorized to withhold grants or assistance programs from areas where discrimination is practiced, provided they informed Congress beforehand and held a public hearing.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Ohio: The State Fair Employment Practices Act bans discrimination because of race, color, religion, etc., on the part of employers of four or more persons, employment agencies, or labor unions.

Proposed Federal: This section declares a national policy of freedom from discrimination in opportunity for employment. It would not become effective until a year after the bill is signed into law and in the initial year would cover employers and unions with 100 or more workers or members.

This provision would be tightened gradually until the fourth year of its effectiveness when it would cover those with 25 or more workers or members.

The law would be administered by an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of five members empowered to act in complaints filed by individuals. It could bring legal action only after attempts to settle cases by conciliation.

The commission, however, would be required to work with State and local agencies, such as that in Ohio, unless such agencies were not performing effectively.

What form a Federal civil rights bill will take, if and when one is passed, is of course impossible to determine. The prolonged Senate debate now appears to be some weeks away from the filibuster stage, and indications are that the House version will be toned down with Republican-sponsored amendments.

Yet it is apparent that the impact of any bill enacted will be felt almost exclusively in the South. For Ohio and the other 35 States with civil rights codes of one kind or another, it would mean only that Washington would become a secondary point of recourse for those with grievances, real or fancied.

SECRECY AND THE A–11 PROGRAM

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I am glad to yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, a short time ago, I spoke briefly as to the facts surrounding the announcement of the President of the United States concerning the A–11 program.

It is interesting to note, from the testimony and the articles which have appeared subsequently, that the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, and certainly a great majority of the members of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations apparently had no knowledge whatever, even of the beginning of the development of the A–11. During the past 3 years, there has been extensive testimony before that committee, discussing the B–70 and the RS–70. The technical matters surrounding that work tie in intimately wtih the development of any supersonic plane, particularly in the area of mach 3.

I am greatly indebted to outside reporters who have ferreted out a part of the truth behind this matter. It is somewhat difficult to understand how this country could have spent $100 million to $500 million in the development of a supersonic plane, which is probably—although we do not know—an improved manned interceptor, without the Appropriations Committee having knowledge of it.

I am informed by the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] that he did have knowledge of it, and that he was fully informed. This does not evade the responsibility of every Senator who serves on that committee in the Senate, and every Representative who serves on the corresponding committee in the House of Representatives, to account to the people of his own State and to the people of the United States and to have knowledge of the functions of the Government.

If we can develop an airplane which must have cost from $100 million to $500 million—the best estimate is $500 million ,over the course of 2, 3, or 4 years, no one knows how long—without the Appropriations Committees of the Congress having knowledge of such appropriations, questions arise as the source of the money, and where was it hidden in the budget.

Mr. President, I intend to pursue this matter further, because in my opinion it represents a grave threat to our representative form of government. It represents an abrogation of the right of Senators to know what is going on in the Government and to bear the responsibility for the decisions which are made.

A decision was made. It was made in our name, using hidden funds, and other methods to which I do not have access. But, somehow, it was accomplished. I hope that the Secretary of Defense particularly, and anyone else who had knowledge of these matters, will disclose the information to Congress at an early date.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Less Than the Whole Truth," written by Claude Witze and published in the Air Force magazine of April 1964, which discusses this situation in detail.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LESS THAN THE WHOLE TRUTH

(By Claude Witze)

WASHINGTON, D.C., March 18.—There are substantial reasons why public pressure

should be maintained for the revelation of more facts about the new Lockheed A–11 mach 3 airplane. And none of the facts that should be public property in this democracy will menace national security if they are disclosed. The A–11, like the TFX, the RS–70, and the Skybolt missile before it, is involved in arguments about concept and policy that are properly the subject of public discussion.

The general capabilities of the A–11 and the mission for which it was designed can be aired before Congress and the voters without disclosing any specific information about the technologies involved and the precise threat it presents to a potential enemy. If the A–11 is undergoing tests to determine how good it is as an interceptor, which is what we were told by the White House, the threat to the enemy will not be real until the system is combat ready. The A–11 is far from that state and may never reach it.

Details of President Johnson's announcement that the A–11 exists and an analysis of its technological significance appear starting on page 33 of this issue. Of equal importance is the administration's insistence that the A–11 is an interceptor aircraft and that it meets the Air Force requirement for an Improved Manned Intercetpor (IMI). So long as the news about the A–11 is carefully managed, the administration is not likely to get a serious challenge to its assertion, but the atmosphere on Capitol Hill is charged with skepticism. When Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, was testifying a few weeks ago before the House Armed Services Committee, he said, "We need a new long-range interceptor and we feel that $40 million this year will move us in an orderly program toward producing it." Asked at what point we are in the IMI program, he said, "We are doing some work in this field, but we are not going fast enough to have an orderly program to produce it." He made a further statement that was deleted from the published record.

Whatever the general told the committee in confidence, the House included the $40 million in its version of the defense authorization bill. There is no evidence in the record that Chairman CARL VINSON or any of his colleagues knew of the A–11 or considered it the prototype of an interceptor if they did know about it. Chairman MELVIN PRICE of the Subcommittee on Research and Development voted with the majority in favor of granting the money. Three Democratic members of his subcommittee, Representatives SAMUEL S. STRATTON, JEFFREY COHELAN, and OTIS G. PIKE, voted against it and signed a minority report. In this, they argued the money had not been requested from the subcommittee but indicated they knew of progress made toward an IMI. They then picked up the argument of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara that there are several airplanes which could take on the IMI mission, citing the F–106, the F–4, and the TFX or F–111. General LeMay already had said he wants something better.

There was a strange change of attitude in the Senate. The $40 million item was dropped from the bill. After the A–11 was uncovered Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, floor manager for the bill, bolstered the President's portrayal of it as an interceptor. He said he had been privy to all of its history and that what has been learned has applicability to other types of aircraft. The Senator said the $40 million was taken out of the bill becaues the A–11 already is past the research-and-development stage and is undergoing test and evaluation. He said he did not know why the Air Force, meaning General LeMay, asked for the money.

Secretary McNamara was the next witness in Washington. He told a press conference, "The A–11 is an interceptor aircraft, it is being developed as such, and beyond that I have nothing further to say on its use." He said the Air Force naturally knew all about the A–11 and that there was an misunderstanding about what was requested. This was not new money, he said, but a request "to have the authority within the total funds budgeted to reallocate funds to increase the expenditures on the IMI and to reduce expenditures on certain other projects." He said there is no doubt that the A–11 is the plane USAF has in mind for the IMI mission.

One of the more significant sentences in Mr. McNamara's remarks was his comment that "hopefully, we can have multiuse aircraft evolve from the single-purpose designs."

It is this conviction of his, first brought to fruition in the TFX joint USAF-Navy project, that has not been accepted by experienced airmen in any branch of the services. The A–11, it has not been denied, was laid down in 1959 as a high-flying and fast reconnaissance airplane and the undisclosed amount of money that has gone into it would be hard to disguise in USAF's budget. It could have been financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, but that is not as important as the fact that the reconnaissance and interceptor missions cannot be performed efficiently by the same airplane. It is obvious that the technologies overlap in such areas as propulsion, materials, human factors, and aerodynamics, but weapon systems differ according to their missions.

All through the discussion following the A–11 announcement here has been an aura of the half-truth about administration statements. Asked bluntly whether the A–11 had been designed as an interceptor, Secretary McNamara replied, "I don't think that I said that, and I would rather not say." Nobody asked, "Why not?" It was brought out in General LeMay's testimony that all of the Chiefs of Staff favored going ahead with an IMI and that even the Chairman, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, gave it his endorsement. USAF Secretary Eugene Zuckert testified that "No formal proposal has gone forward from the Air Force, that is, from the civilian Secretary [Mr. Zuckert] to the Secretary of Defense. I did write him a letter in which I said it looked as if we were progressing to the point where we would need a sizable sum of money such as the one General LeMay mentioned for 1965."

Later Representative PORTER HARDY quizzed the Air Force Secretary and asked whether Mr. McNamara showed any signs of "mellowing" or beginning to understand the requirement for an IMI. Mr. Zuckert acknowledged that his boss was not "too encouraging." He added that he favors a larger development program than the Defense Secretary, but "I have not personally proposed that we build a force of any particular size leading toward a full defense capability with an IMI."

Further quotations are not needed to display the status of the IMI project, at least as it stood in February. If we accept the natal date of the A–11 as 1959, it seems clear that nobody called it an Air Force airplane at least until sometime in 1963, by which time the concept probably had been overtaken by more esoteric systems operating in space. If the A–11 was designed as an IMI there was no reason to blanket its existence with any more secrecy than would have surrounded the F–108, interceptor counterpart of the B–70 and also designed by North American Aviation, if that project had not been abandoned a few years ago. It was after cancellation of the F–108 that airmen concerned with the defense mission, most notably Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, first proclaimed the requirement for an IMI. If they knew the A–11 was being developed as an interceptor, which they should have known if it is true, their speeches, in retrospect, make little sense.

Since disclosure of the A–11 by President Johnson, most of the verbiage has been concerned with its place in the history of aeronautical progress and the fact that the story was kept out of the public prints, whether by publicists or patriots. The emphasis has been in the wrong places. The sophisticated observer, be he aeronaut, editor, or military officer, knows that USAF does not develop a new interceptor by starting with a vehicle that flies higher and faster, with limited maneuverability, and then try to determine its capability. The interceptor capability would be built in, starting on the design boards. There is much justification for suspecting that the A–11 has been used for manipulation of American public opinion, possibly to cast aspersions on Air Force competence in an area of Air Force specialization. The outlook for national security is frightening if this kind of manipulation is allowed to continue, making it look as if technology escaped the grasp of the men with the mission.

WHY DOESN'T ANYBODY GET MAD?

As we write this, the East Germans, who are Communists, are withholding information on the condition of three USAF officers who were shot down a few days ago when their RB–66 reconnaissance bomber strayed out of its flight path. A compilation by the Associated Press shows that in the past 14 years at least 80 American military flyers have been killed by Russians in attacks that ranged from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan. The airmen have been from the ranks of the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Air Force.

So far, there has been no sign of official indignation in Washington other than a demand for the release of our men. Our attitude, according to the Washington Post, is tempered by our "hopes to avoid having the incident damage the relatively moderate climate of present American-Soviet relations." Indeed, the Post, which should know better, peers around the 80 corpses and poses an editorial question: "What is wrong with the Air Force that it cannot prevent its planes from wandering over Communist East Germany and getting shot down?" Then the paper says U.S. Air Force does not say the airplane strayed but suggests it was lured by phony radio signals.

Somehow, the lives of 80 American flyers seem to have been sacrificed in near silence while the climate of our relations with Russia shows no material change. It should be pointed out that the Washington Post, which hesitates to put any blame on the Russians, is a paper that speaks out loud and clear in favor of avoiding escalation in any conflict with the Reds. The response should be nonviolent to most provocation, according to this school of thought, and if it must be violent it should be graduated to the minutest degree possible. The Communists disagree.

Any responsible reporter could learn by asking that U.S. Air Force pilots have strict orders not to resist challenges in the air, even if they are armed. The Russians, in this case, destroyed an airplane which they could have had intact with its airborne equipment if they had told the pilot to land instead of shooting him down. This indicates they were more intent on murder than capturing the RB–66 to see what reconnaissance equipment it was carrying. A responsible reporter also could have learned that the pilot was following a filed flight plan for a navigation training mission that was to be flown entirely in France and West Germany. An informed reporter would know that the RB–66 is an obsolescent airplane and it is not likely it would be sent on a sensitive mission so close to the Iron Curtain. Even an editorial writer, lacking all these facts, should be able to re-

peratures experienced by aircraft traveling at more than three times the speed of sound."

As reported by Claude Witze on page 16 of this issue, a tight information clamp has forestalled meaningful public discussion of the A–11, its genesis, or its proper role in civil and military aviation.

The following questions are typical of those which should be asked, for the answers concern the use of a very large sum of the taxpayers' money. Congress and the public have a legitimate right to frank answers.

How much did the A–11 and its engines cost? Judging from previous pioneering programs that fought their technical battles out beyond the state of the art, the A–11, with its mach-3-plus performance, titanium construction, and high-temperature engines cost at least $500 million and possibly $1 billion. That is $100 to $200 million per year for the 5 years the program has been active. (President Johnson said the A–11 design work started in 1959. The J–58 program was initiated several years earlier by the Navy.) This kind of money is in the cost range of the much-criticized and now-defunct nuclear airplane, and programs of this magnitude should get a thorough working over by the Congress.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the information available is that the A–11 was originally developed for the CIA as a high-altitude reconnaissance airplane to replace the U–2. Most reporters reached this conclusion, supported largely by the close secrecy on the airplane, Mr. McNamara's refusal to divulge the original design objective, and the fact that the project was not handled in normal management channels. If this conclusion is correct, several questions arise immediately concerning the past and future expenditure of large sums of money:

1. Does the fact that a given airplane can cruise at mach 3 also mean that it automatically has a multipurpose capability—reconnaissance, interceptor, bomber—without a major design change for each type of mission?

2. If the answer is no, was there coordination between the CIA and the DOD at an early stage to make certain that the A–11 was not hopelessly boxed into one role?

3. Can the A–11 development expedite the supersonic-transport (SST) program?

4. Have reconnaissance satellites eliminated the need for reconnaissance aircraft such as the A–11, and will it therefore end up only as a high-cost experimental aircraft with limited capability?

Precise answers will require the most candid discussion of the current version of the A–11 and its design and development history. Certainly no one can judge the exact performance or mission capability of a supersonic-cruise airplane using only the two side-view photographs and brief statements currently available on the A–11.

Estimates of this type are riskier for supersonic-cruise airplanes than they are for subsonic aircraft or for those that are capable of only short dashes at supersonic speed.

Basically, supersonic-cruise airplanes involve extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is extremely sensitive to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic efficiency (lift/drag ratio, written L/D). Small mistakes in predicting these values can lead to large errors in payload and range.

Fortunately, the supply of technical literature concerned with these problems is large. This literature points to some general conclusions about the A–11 and places some broad limits on the possible performance of this new aircraft.

The difficulties described in this literature also provide the best tribute to Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson and his "Skonk Works" colleagues at Lockheed, who, with the J–58 engineers at Pratt & Whitney, led the team that first achieved supersonic cruise.

Here is what can be deduced about the A–11, based on this literature:

Size: The airplane is about 90 feet long based on scaling of the A–11 pictures, using published data on the J58 diameter and estimating the size of the pilot's helmet visible in the front window. There is room in the slim fuselage and in the wing stub areas for more than 70,000 pounds of fuel, with space left over for substantial mission equipment. Since efficient supersonic-cruise airplanes have to carry at least 50 percent of their weight in fuel, the A–11 takeoff weight apparently is more than 150,000 pounds. This is roughly the same as that of the B–58 bomber.

Wing: Densely loaded aircraft such as the A–11 need large wing areas; otherwise their wing loadings will quickly rise above 100 pounds per square foot and severely reduce both cruise altitude and flight efficiency.

The side view photographs obscure most of the A–11 wing, and published drawings of the A–11 have not indicated a large lifting surface. However, the aircraft must have an effective wing area in the neighborhood of 2,000 square feet. This includes not only the area outboard of the engine nacelles but also the area between the engines, and the area of the long, very narrow wings on the fuselage, which have been referred to in some reports as fairings. The long and narrow wings form the forward section of a large, double-delta wing similar to that used by Lockheed in its supersonic transport proposal. At supersonic speeds these long, narrow wings plus the fuselage area between them generate much more lift than they do at subsonic speeds.

This generation of additional lift up forward is important in maintaining control over the airplane above mach 1. The controllability problem arises because the rear portion of the double delta acts like a conventional lifting surface at supersonic speeds, and its center of lift moves abruptly aft, a long distance away from the center of gravity. This can make the aircraft so stable that it can't be controlled by a normal-size horizontal tail. In any event, it calls for a large deflection of the tail and an unacceptably big trim drag, which eats into range. On the A–11, lift on the long, narrow wings counteracts the shift of center of lift on the main surface and keeps the center of lift near the center of gravity. On some designs a small canard (horizontal) surface near the nose serves this purpose. The Swedish Saab Draken, the mach 2 fighter operational for several years, was the first of the so-called tailless (no conventional horizontal tail and no canard) airplanes to use the double-delta planform.

Design mach number: The centerbodies of the engine air inlets on the A–11's in the photographs released by the White House appear to have a ramp angle suitable for a maximum economical cruise speed slightly above mach 3.

Cruise altitude: Most press reports have placed the A-11's maximum cruise altitude between 90,000 and 125,000 feet. This appears to be a serious error. There is a well-established procedure for checking maximum cruise altitude. It indicates that the A-11 must cruise between 70,000 and 80,000 feet or its range will severely suffer. Thus, the A-11 can be expected to get its maximum range while cruising about 6,000 to 10,000 feet below the U-2. The U-2's superior wing and lower wing loading give it better altitude capability in unaccelerated flight. But in a zoom climb the A–11 would outperform it.

To figure maximum cruise altitude you have to know two characteristics of any aircraft—the wing loading (written W/S and equal to the gross weight divided by the wing area), and the lift coefficient (written C_L, a dimensionless number indicating the lifting power of the wing) generated when the aircraft is flying at the proper angle of attack for maximum range (maximum aerodynamic efficiency). When the W/S is divided by the C_L, it equals the dynamic pressure required to keep the aircraft in level flight. The dynamic pressure is the term that fixes the altitude of flight for any given speed.

There is enough information on the A–11 to put the above relationships to work. For instance, when the A-11 is flying at mach 3 at 70,000 feet, the dynamic pressure is nearly 600 pounds per square foot. The lift coefficient for maximum L/D is about .1 (this has been confirmed in many NASA reports on aircraft similar to the A-11). So 600 may be multiplied by 0.1 to give a maximum possible wing loading of about 60 pounds per square foot. This is about the wing loading the A-11 would have if it had a 2,000-square-foot wing area, weighed 150,000 pounds at takeoff, and burned about one-third of its 75,000-pound fuel load during its climb to altitude.

This procedure can be run through again to show that the A–11's wing loading would be a little better than 30 pounds per square foot once it had burned all its fuel. It, therefore, would end its cruise at mach 3 at 80,000 feet.

Speed would not change this picture too much. If the A–11 were capable of mach 4, it would begin its cruise at about 82,000 feet and in the lightened condition at the end of cruise would be flying at nearly 95,000 feet.

The press reports of 125,000-foot altitude completely fall apart under check. If the A–11 flew at that altitude at mach 4 it would need a wing loading of less than 10 pounds per square foot. In other words its structure could not be any heavier than that of a Piper Cub.

Or, if the A–11 tried to fly at 125,000 feet at a wing loading of about 30 pounds per square foot, corresponding to an end-of-cruise weight, its speed would have to be at least mach 8 to maintain level flight and to keep it from stalling out.

The same procedures can be used to show that the U–2's altitude during maximum range cruise will vary from about 75,000 feet to a little more than 90,000 feet.

Another check on the operational altitude of the A–11 can be made by examining the engine air inlets which appear to be about 6 feet in diameter at the most. Therefore, the maximum capture area for both inlets to take in air is between 50 and 60 square feet. This is just about enough to fly an airplane like the A–11 at 80,000 feet at mach 3. At 100,000 feet at mach 3 the required capture area goes well over 100 square feet. At 125,000 feet the inlets would become truly gigantic.

In recent years, the ability of Century-series fighters to zoom higher than 100,000 feet has tended to distort the picture as far as maximum cruise altitude and maximum level flight altitude are concerned. Most of the Century-series fighters cruise best between 35,000 and 45,000 feet, and their maximum level flight altitude is around 60,000 feet. Therefore, the A–11's ability to cruise in the 70,000- to 80,000-foot level is certainly not to be disparaged. With the A–11 cruising at mach 3 at those altitudes, on a gentle dogleg course, it would be essentially impossible for any operational fighter in the world to intercept it. And it is doubtful that any existing ground-based missile system could down the airplane.

Aerodynamic efficiency: The A–11 came along in time to benefit from several years of inspired aerodynamic research during the middle and late 1950's. By 1960 the unclassified literature had made it clear that the old idea that L/D (aerodynamic efficiency) was certain to be less than five at mach numbers above 3 had to be discarded. There were strong indications that L/D's of 7 and 8 and possibly higher could be attained.

model only slightly better than the original version, probably is around 3,500 miles. This assumes an L/D of 6, an SFC of 2.0, and 50 percent of the aircraft weight in fuel, with about one-third of it being consumed in the climb to altitude. Boron fuel would add around 1,000 miles to the range.

If it has been possible to achieve the maximum L/D's and SFC's suggested in the Lockheed paper mentioned above, the range would go over 5,000 miles on hydrocarbon fuel. This assumes an L/D of 8 and an SFC of 1.5. But this level of performance probably will not be achieved for some time.

Development schedule: It has been reported that the A–11 was delivered and flown for the first time in 1961; that is slightly more than 2 years after design work started. The same report also claims that the A–11 has been operational for 2 years, meaning 1963 and most of 1962. That would leave about 1 year, early 1961 to early 1962, for flight testing.

If this report is true, it would have been necessary during this 1 year to move in relatively small speed increments toward mach 3 to make sure that all systems were responding properly to all speed, temperature, and vibration conditions. The inevitable fixes would have been made and the modified systems rechecked. Finally, it would have been necessary to move slowly toward maximum-range flights, by cruising at mach 3 for longer and longer periods to ensure that all systems were withstanding the high-temperature soaking.

Under any conceivable set of circumstances, designing, fabricating, flight testing, and bringing a pioneering, first-generation, mach 3 cruise airplane to operational status in 3 years would be an almost miraculous achievement. True, the CIA-type management system is conducive to rapid developments. In effect, the CIA simply says to the contractor, "Bring us one of these. We are making you responsible for performing all tests and making all technical decisions."

The U–2 was designed this way and delivered for first flight in little more than 1 year. But the U–2 was a completely straightforward project with a well-known type of wing, aluminum construction, and a slightly modified version of a well-developed turbojet. The A–11 designers were breaking new ground in every department, although they did have access to development data from the B–70 and J93 projects.

It seems reasonable that design, fabrication, and ground testing of the A–11 and its systems took nearly 4 years and that the first flight took place in 1963. Less than a year of flight testing probably would have allowed President Johnson to say that the aircraft "has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 m.p.h.," and is "capable of * * * long-range performance of thousands of miles." He didn't say the range had been achieved.

But if the shorter development time reported is true, the SST program certainly bears review. If any mach 3 cruise airplane can be brought to operational status from scratch in 3 years, then maybe the FAA is correct in taking the position that SST costs, technical uncertainties, and development time will be much lower than industry estimates.

Development of an economic supersonic transport is a much more difficult problem than the A–11, but if the CIA's handsoff management concept can indeed get us a mach 3 airplane in 3 years, this concept certainly should be considered for the SST. And the Pentagon could benefit from this example as well.

Supersonic transport: The A–11 probably can spell the difference between success and failure in any U.S. mach 2.5-plus supersonic transport program. The A–11 provides an immediately available means of getting vital flight-test time on all SST systems. It will yield data on the performance of titanium structure at mach 3 that could not be obtained by any other means. And, when the SST engines are ready, the A–11 will allow them to be exhaustively tested in flight in a known vehicle and not an unproven SST airframe. By allowing such testing, the A–11 will fill a gap in the Government's SST plan that has worried many in industry. The A–11 experience should make it possible to go ahead in an orderly manner and build the SST, which must be a true second-generation, supersonic-cruise airplane that has high aerodynamic and propulsion efficiency at all subsonic and supersonic speeds, and an extremely rugged titanium structure which can last through 10 years of airline flying.

By any standard the A–11 is a magnificent technical achievement. Quite obviously it can outfly any known aircraft in the world by a substantial margin. It is a natural for reconnaissance. However, if the A–11 is from the U–2 mold and built with an extremely light airframe, it will not have significant combat potential as a bomber or an interceptor without major redesign. Even if such redesign is not forthcoming, the A–11 will play a key research role in building the technology of mach 3-plus cruise airplanes of all types—transport, fighters, and bombers. In this role its ultimate importance to aviation and the Nation may be as great as any aircraft ever built.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, in closing, what is most disturbing about this situation is that we received from the Secretary of Defense and his Director of Research, Dr. Harold Brown, over the last 3 years, many reasons—which I shall not discuss at this point—why we could not develop a B–70 or an RS–70, and why it was not practical from a technical standpoint, when in fact they knew they were developing a plane and already had it in the works. In fact, it was operational and had overcome many of the defects which had been discussed in committee.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Colorado yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I am glad to yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I ask the Senator to yield so that I may commend him for raising this question regarding the supersonic plane, and to make the further point that I have also raised the question concerning secrecy, the failure of the executive branch to properly involve Congress, and the decision to channel such matters through the Central Intelligence Agency.

Almost every time the question of secrecy is raised, Senators rise and state that there are some Members of the Senate who are made privy to certain inside information. No one knows. I believe the senior Senator on the Appropriations Committee thought he was being reasonably fully informed on these vital matters, but it seems that that was not the case.

I believe we must raise this question about every vital area of government upon which there is the possibility of secrecy and determination of matters by the executive branch, and with respect to which Congress, which has the congressional responsibility, is not necessarily fully informed, but at least is adequately informed and is called upon to participate in a judgment. I hope that progress will be made in opening up some of the other areas in which there is too much secrecy, and in which Congress is excluded from vital judgments affecting the welfare of the country.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. I agree with him completely. I have never had a more flagrant case called to my attention. I know that there are certain matters which are of a highly sensitive nature. So long as I know that the senior members of my committee, both minority and majority, are aware of them, I do not object, because I know that the information is available to me.

Mr. McCARTHY. As a matter of principle, we should not allow it. If we were to permit the executive branch to decide which Members of Congress to confide in, the next step would be to ask, Why not let the Secretary of State name the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, or the Secretary of Defense the members of the Armed Services Committee?

Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator is entirely correct. When I look back, I believe that some of the statements I have made about the B–70 and the RS–70 really are ridiculous in light of the new announcement and in light of the information which I ought to have had but did not have.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for yielding.

NEED FOR STUDY OF STRIP MINING OF COAL AND OTHER MINERALS

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, several weeks ago I introduced a bill that would authorize a study of strip mining operations of coal and other minerals throughout the country.

The bill is now pending in the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Today I received a letter from Mr. John C. Kinder, a citizen in Belmont County, Ohio. Belmont County is in the eastern area of our State, on the Ohio River. It is in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains.

In the past this industry has consisted mainly of the mining of coal. I have no doubt that Belmont County and other counties immediately adjacent to it properly fall within the definition of the Appalachias which are now being discussed in the newspapers.

The purpose of my presentation this morning is to demonstrate the inconsistency and the folly of Government on the one hand in providing subsidies used for the destruction of the land, and on the other hand in spending moneys through the Appalachia program to restore destroyed land into what is said will be gardens of paradise with vegetation growing, recreational grounds available, and lakes fit for use by the public as it comes into the area.

The two operations are completely inconsistent. It is the equivalent of trying to build the front of the house while the back of the house is on fire. That is exactly what is happening in Belmont, Harrison, Jefferson, Morgan, Colum-

refuge in Rhode Island and created there a government to make a free commonwealth possible.

Free majority rule was made the principle of democratic government, civil liberties and all basic human rights. The darkness of persecution of minorities because of race or religion was lifted by the light of liberty as Roger Williams brought it to Rhode Island. It made bright the path to the ideals of tolerance and opportunity for all. These are the marks and the merits of free government. These are the values we cherish today.

This is our free government of the majority where minorities may not be oppressed, where tolerance and opportunity are our common rights—not as something new and novel—but rights and responsibilities that have been engraved in our hearts these hundreds of years as our heritage from Roger Williams—our American heritage.

As we dedicate ourselves to the preservation and sharing of those rights—in that measure do we observe this Independence Day—in that measure, we deserve it.

DEDICATION OF HALLAM (NEBR.) NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, preparations are underway for dedication of the Nation's most advanced commercial atomic powerplant. This is the Hallam Nuclear Power facility, located near Hallam, Nebr., approximately 20 miles south of Lincoln.

The Hallam facility is part of the Atomic Energy Commission's program to develop economic power from nuclear energy. Consumers Public Power District of Nebraska provided the plant site and the turbine generator, and is operating the plant.

Designed and built for the AEC by Atomics International, a division of North American Aviation, Inc., the Hallam facility uses a sodium cooled, graphite moderated reactor, the first of its kind to go on the production line in the United States.

Atomics International technicians have provided the following description of the Hallam plant's operating principle:

Liquid sodium removes heat produced by fission or burning of the nuclear fuel in the core of the reactor. The heat is then used to generate steam. The reactor core consists of slightly enriched uranium-molybdenum fuel elements suspended between canned graphite moderator-reflector elements. Graphite moderates or slows down the neutrons to help sustain the nuclear fission process.

Sodium has excellent heat transfer properties and its use results in a low-pressure, high-temperature reactor capable of producing the steam conditions required by today's turbine generators. The Nebraska reactor generates steam at 830° Fahrenheit—highest temperature steam of any commercial atomic plant in the Nation.

Several outstanding safety features are incorporated into the Hallam plant, features which stem from the inherent properties of sodium. Since the boiling point of sodium is high, the reactor is operated at essentially atmospheric pressure. A containment-type reactor building, therefore, is not required.

The Hallam reactor building is a massive structure, towering about eight stories high, and extends another eight stories underground. Some 362,000 pounds of graphite were used in constructing the reactor. The amount of concrete poured into the nuclear facility alone would pave 9 miles of highway; 10 miles of fuel tubing are contained in the reactor.

Seven-foot concrete blocks, each weighing 8 tons, are used as plugs for entryways to intermediate heat exchanger cells when the reactor is operating. The reactor itself is below ground. At the floor level, the 500,000-pound fuel-handling machine reaches 54 feet into the air. Its primary purpose is to exchange new and spent fuel elements in the reactor; and it is capable of handling two fuel elements, each weighing 1,500 pounds. When operating at full capacity, the reactor will house approximately 150 fuel elements.

The Hallam nuclear power facility was authorized by the Atomic Energy Commission as part of the first round of its power demonstration reactor program. Final design of the plant began in September 1958, and ground was broken for construction in April of 1959.

The Hallam reactor first achieved self-sustaining nuclear fission in January 1962; it first generated electricity on May 29, 1963; and it was operated at full power on July 16, 1963.

Atomics International was responsible for the design, fabrication, and installation of all reactor components and for testing and the startup of the Nebraska plan.

Consumers Public Power District was responsible for construction of the conventional plant, including the turbine-generator and auxiliaries, conventional services such as feedwater and steam systems auxiliary steam, instrument, and service air.

The Hallam facility is part of the Consumers Sheldon Station, which includes a coal-fired or gas-fired boiler and turbine-generator, as well as the nuclear reactor and steam generator equipment. The design allows the turbine to accept steam from either heat source; or, if desired, the two sources may be paralleled.

This plant represents a giant step forward in this atomic age. Technicians have estimated that the fission of 1 pound of uranium produces as much energy as 1,400 tons of coal, or 250,000 gallons of gasoline, or 40 million cubic feet of natural gas.

In this fast-paced world of ours, the Hallam plant may look rather primitive in years to come. But right now it is a "first" in its field; and nuclear scientists around the world are watching it.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Milwaukee Journal has published a very fine and helpful editorial entitled "The Meaning Is Clear," for those of us engaged in debate on the civil rights bill; and I should like read it in full, because it is such an excellent editorial:

THE MEANING IS CLEAR

One glibly parroted remark against the civil rights bill is that it does not even define "discrimination." Like so much else that passes for gospel among nonreaders of the bill, this is false and malicious gossip.

Its only iota of truth is that the bill does not need in so many words to quote the dictionary. There is no occasion for the draftsmen to use the style of saying, "'Discrimination' as used herein means, etc."

Specific forbidden acts are in fact defined a dozen times throughout the six operating sections of the bill. They are all discriminations of one kind or another, and the meaning of the language cannot possibly be mistaken by anybody.

Title I spells out that no registration officer shall apply different standards to different individuals in ruling on eligibility to vote in Federal elections, nor shall he deny registration on any excuse of technical errors that have no bearing on qualifications. It is perfectly obvious that these acts are what is meant by "discrimination" in title I.

Title II says that "all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities" and so on in specified places of public accommodation "without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin." Is there any problem in knowing what that means?

Title III sets up remedies for denial of access to public facilities like parks on account of race, etc.—a perfectly clear definition of a discriminatory act. Title IV does have a list of definitions in which "desegregation" means "the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race," etc. (but not "the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance").

Title VI leaves no question that racial exclusion from any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance is discrimination. Title VII, finally, describes seven specific distinctions based on race that will be unlawful in employment, apprenticeship and union membership.

No one with even elementary understanding can read the bill without knowing precisely what it means by "discrimination."

POLISH CONSTITUTION DAY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I believe it is most important to remember that yesterday, May 3, was Polish Constitution Day. This event is of utmost significance to American citizens who honor their ancestral home in Poland, and to many Polish refugees around the world who yearn for the day when Poland will be free of communism and they can return.

The May 3 Constitution was a remarkable document for its day. It provided significant reforms in Polish Government, including many democratic freedoms; and it might have provided Poland with a stable constitutional monarchy, which today would operate much like the Government of Great Britain.

But the May 3 Constitution has come to mean even more to Poles, as a symbolic recognition of their right to be free. It was written and promulgated by the outstanding Poles of the day. King Stanislas II played an important role in its adoption. While many of its ideas originated in the liberal philosophy of Britain, the United States, and France, it was uniquely adapted to Poland's needs. It promised to bring freedom where it had never existed, stability where there had been only chaos, and an independent Poland where there had been only foreign domination.

The strength of Polish love for the May 3 constitution is evidenced by the fact that it lasted for 4 years against vicious onslaughts from two sides. It was finally overcome only through two

afterthought, a set of thin, sweptback wings that measure only 40 feet from tip to tip. At 80,000 feet, the dart called the A–11 can fly at 2,200 miles per hour—about mach 3.4, or more than three times the speed of sound. The airplane carries only enough fuel for 90 minutes of flight, but that is enough to cover 3,300 miles—say from New York to Lisbon, Portugal.

The A–11 was planned as long ago as 1958 when the U–2 was still serenely cruising Russia's skies at 70,000 feet, taking pictures of Soviet industry and military installations while frustrated Russian Mig pilots craned their necks and followed far below.

But the CIA knew it was only a matter of time before a Russian missile shot a U–2 out of the stratosphere. With the help of the Air Force, the CIA set about creating a superspy successor to the U–2. By 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was shot down, the development of the A–11 was well underway at the huge Lockheed Aircraft plant in Burbank, Calif. The CIA official in charge of the A–11 program was Richard M. Bissell, who was known within the Agency as commanding general of the RMBAF—the Richard M. Bissell Air Force. The first plane in the RMBAF was the U–2; the second was the A–11.

To date, the A–11 has cost about $500 million, a bargain by the current rule of thumb that a new aircraft will cost at least $1 billion before the first production model is ordered. About 18 months ago the A–11 began flying from a secret location in the Far West. The dozen models that have been built so far are not yet fully operational, however, according to one man who worked closely with the aircraft, and the published report that flights have been made over Communist territory is false.

Indeed, the A–11 is still hampered by two technical problems: varying the flow of fuel for effective combustion at different altitudes, and controlling the flow of air into the engines.

When these bugs are eliminated, the A–11 will be a magnificent spy. While it carries no weapons—something of a handicap for an interceptor—the aircraft is loaded with the latest aerial cameras, side-view radar and sophisticated electronic equipment for collecting what the Air Force calls "elint" (electronic intelligence). The CIA and the Air Force are counting on its speed, altitude, and missile-jamming gear to escape the Sam rockets that brought down Powers.

Although the United States promised to stop flying over Russia after the U–2 incident, it made no such commitments for the Communist-bloc nations or Red China. And the A–11 is undoubtedly intended to supplement the work of the orbiting SAMOS satellites, which send back their pictures by television, and the little-known Air Force satellites, which reportedly take pictures and drop them into recovery areas in the Pacific. The great advantage of the A–11 over a satellite is that it can be dispatched quickly to take pictures of specific areas. If war did come, the A–11 would have the vital task of searching out targets that had escaped the early waves of missiles and bombers.

Because of its intended mission, the secept of the A–11 was extraordinarily well kept. Not even all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew about it. "I'm a complete blank on the A–11," admits Gen. George H. Decker, who retired in 1962 as the Army's Chief of Staff. "I have no recollection that the plane was ever discussed by the Joint Chiefs." Adm. David L. McDonald, the current Chief of Naval Operations, learned about the A–11 along with the rest of the Nation when President Johnson revealed it.

But, when, after announced the plane's existence, the President and McNamara ignored the A–11's origins and said it was an interceptor—or was becoming one—they dumped the new wonder plane into one of the most briskly boiling caldrons in the Pentagon.

Since he became boss of the Pentagon—and he bosses it more completely than any other Defense Secretary in history—McNamara has been clashing with the Air Force with growing frequency and sharpness. The basic issue that splits the two is the question of how much reliability should be placed on missiles as against manned aircraft. McNamara has been turning steadily toward missiles and away from airplanes. The Air Force, while endorsing the missiles, insists that there is still a role in modern warfare for an airplane carrying a man who can make decisions instantly as the shape of battle changes. To date, Secretary McNamara has steadfastly denied the Air Force request for a new bomber, the B–70. And, until 2 months ago, he had been equally adamant about a new fighter.

The controversy over development of a new interceptor dates back at least to 1961, when the administration stopped buying the F–106, still the most modern interceptor in the Air Defense Command. The plans for the F–106 were laid down in the early fifties, a couple of generations ago in the chronology of aircraft design. The peak operating altitude for the F–106 is about 50,000 feet, where its top speed—for short sprints—is slightly more than mach 2, or about 1,500-plus miles per hour. The last new design for an interceptor—the F–108—was killed in 1959 by the Eisenhower administration.

McNamara's main argument against developing a new interceptor is that the F–106, old as it is, can handle any foreseeable threat. Its radar reportedly can pick up an enemy airplane about 90 miles away, and any target the plane can spot on radar it can hit with a rocket. "Interception today is more a search than a chase problem," says a Defense official. "The argument that an interceptor has to go faster than its target is a holdover from days when you had to chase the target down and machinegun it."

The Air Force agrees with McNamara that the F–106 can do a good job against the present generation of Soviet bombers carrying hydrogen weapons that have to be hauled over the target and dropped. The fight between the Secretary and the service is basically over the future threat of more advanced Soviet bombers.

The Air Force is afraid that Russia will develop a mach 2.5 bomber, which would hopelessly outclass the F–106. Air Force officers cite the Soviet announcement that, like the United States, Britain, and France, it will build a mach 2.5 airliner. "It is no great feat to develop a bomber version from such a supersonic transport," says Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, head of the Air Defense Command. "Traditionally the Soviets have used this approach."

In contrast, McNamara this year told the armed-services committees of the House and Senate that he considered it unlikely the Russians would deploy a new long-range bomber. Testifying on the military budget for fiscal 1965, the Defense Secretary said, "We believe that [the current interceptor force] is appropriate for defense against what we presently see as a declining Soviet manned bomber threat."

When his turn came to testify on Capitol Hill, Gen. Curtis LeMay, the Air Force's burly and blunt Chief of Staff, disagreed sharply with McNamara. LeMay said that the Russians are likely to continue to rely on a mix of bomber and missiles. What was more, LeMay said that the Russians were improving even their current bombers by equipping them with standoff missiles—missiles that can be launched from a bomber while it is standing offshore, hundreds of miles away from its target.

LeMay told Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, chairman of the Senate's Armed Services Committee, that the F–106 does not have the speed or range to counter this tactic. "We can't get out far enough to hit them, to shoot down the bombers before they have launched their missiles," he said. "We need a longer range, higher speed aircraft."

LeMay also wants any new interceptor—known in Pentagon shorthand as an IMI, or improved manned interceptor—to be versatile enough to fight the kind of limited or conventional war that might occur in the 1970's. The Air Force remembers all too clearly that the F–86 was the only American fighter that could stop the Migs in Korea; without the F–86, the United States would have lost air superiority, which undoubtedly would have changed the whole course of the war.

"People laugh at you today when you talk about fighter versus fighter," says one former high-ranking Air Force general. "They tell you how rockets can do everything. But you never can tell. They're using bows and arrows in Vietnam. If the Russians get a better fighter, they can take us out of the sky."

"The Joint Chiefs have said we must go ahead with the IMI," LeMay testified on the Hill. "I say we are going to have to have this aircraft. You might as well make up your mind now."

During his long hours before the committees, McNamara said that he would consider developing a new interceptor if the Russians did deploy a new bomber. But he added that he felt the United States already had aircraft on hand or on order that could be converted into adequate fighters. One plane that Defense is talking about converting someday is the Air Force's F–111, the fighter-bomber now being developed by General Dynamics. The F–111 is the Air Force's version of the controversial TFX, McNamara's attempt to build one airplane that could be used by both the Air Force and Navy.

The Navy's version of the TFX will indeed be an interceptor, with the primary mission of protecting the fleet. But the Air Force claims that the F–111 would not be able to sustain its top speed of about 1,500 miles per hour long enough to reach the bombers before they could release their standoff missiles. "We have studied this in detail but it is not the solution," LeMay told the Senators. "The IMI we propose is a much better airplane."

The IMI that the Air Force would like according to General Thatcher, would fly at mach 3—about the speed of the A–11. This similarity led the Air Force to make an important decision : bout 18 months ago. Having given up all hope of persuading McNamara to build an IMI, Air Force planners began to consider converting the A–11 into an interceptor.

The main trouble with this idea soon turned out to be the fact that the A–11 had been designed so successfully for its special mission. The man who created the A-11 was Lockheed's Clarence (Kelly) Johnson, a former pilot, a skilled mathematician and, by any standard, one of the finest aircraft designers in the world. Johnson also built the highflying U–2, which was extremely successful as a virtual glider but suffered from lack of speed. Working in a secluded hangar nicknamed the "Skonk Works," Johnson set out to give the A–11 the safety of speed as well as altitude. To drive the A–11, Pratt & Whitney modified one of its advanced engines which develops 30,000 pounds of thrust, twice the power of the U–2. Johnson hitched two of them to the rear of his dart. To save weight, Johnson made extensive use of titanium, a light metal that withstands the heat of supersonic flight better than aluminum.

The result was a lightweight, overpowered aircraft that can fly high, fast, and straight—and that's about all. At mach 3 the A–11

Results of 1964 questionnaire

	Yes	No	Not sure
In general, do you favor—			
1. Federal civil rights legislation	1,999	1,013	270
2. U.S. participation in the nuclear test ban treaty	2,282	705	308
3. The recently enacted Federal tax cut—			
A. Regardless of Government's deficit spending	445	719	78
B. Only with a substantial cut in spending	1,717	328	86
C. Only with a balanced budget	1,290	288	95
4. Wheat sales to the Soviet Union—			
A. On a straight cash payment basis	2,231	265	54
B. On credit underwritten in part by tax dollars	219	789	73
C. Not at all	553	689	74
5. Medical care for the aged—			
A. Under social security (King-Anderson) regardless of need	791	774	123
B. Under Federal-State (Kerr-Mills) limited by need	1,519	346	148
C. Keeping U.S. Government out	931	391	134
6. Federal aid to education (other than existing programs)—			
A. At the college or postgraduate levels	1,665	1,007	249
B. At the elementary or secondary levels	1,092	1,172	217
7. A constitutional amendment permitting voluntary nondenominational Bible reading and prayer in public schools	2,337	870	122
8. Major new Federal programs to reduce poverty	1,390	1,376	472
9. Gradual reduction of Government price supports for farm commodities	2,845	178	294
10. A tax deduction or credit for parents paying tuition for their children's education beyond high school	2,571	592	176
11. Continued U.S. support of the United Nations	2,634	419	151
A. If so, even if Red China is admitted	1,695	1,079	284

12. In general, do you think Congress did a good job or a bad job last year?

Good, 377; fair, 1,504; poor, 850; no opinion, 336.

13. What do you believe the United States should do in Vietnam?

(a) Pull out entirely, 605;

(b) continue our current advisory and support role, 984; and

(c) substantially increase U.S. commitment, 1,218.

14. Much of the success of our system of Government has been credited to the doctrine of separation of powers between the courts, the executive (including departments and agencies), and the legislative. Which branch of Government do you think is doing the best job of insuring the continued success of our system of Government?

Legislature, 1,034; courts, 548; executive, 327; FBI, 11; taxpayer, 2; Treasury, 2; military, 1; and Internal Revenue, 1.

COMMENT

It is interesting to compare this year's questionnaire replies with last year's. Approval of a balanced budget and reduction in the national debt were so overwhelming last year as to be almost unanimous. Thus, those questions were not repeated. Last year, the greatest amount of uncertainty resulted from the question "Do you favor the administration's conduct of foreign policy?" Seven hundred and twenty-seven answered "yes," 1,575 voted "no," and 918 "not sure." This year, the greatest amount of uncertainty resulted from the poverty program question.

Although the medicare questions differed slightly from last year to this, the Kerr-Mills plan is still the method of medical care for the aged apparently preferred by the majority. It is also interesting to note that last year a substantial majority favored a sharp reduction in foreign aid. This was evidently the national consensus, for, indeed, foreign aid was substantially reduced last year. Continued U.S. support of the United Nations (one of the strongest votes last year, 2,622 "yes," 502 "no," 261 "not sure") is even more pronounced this year and such support would apparently survive the admission of Red China.

Having served as an elected representative for 14 years, I am, of course, pleased that a substantial majority consider that the legislative branch of the Government is doing a better job of insuring the continued success of our system of Government than the courts or the executive and also rated Congress as doing a "good" or "fair" job.

Fact Magazine

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DURWARD G. HALL

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 12, 1964

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, I inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a radio transcript of the August 3 program of Fulton Lewis, Jr., carried over the Mutual Broadcasting Network. This subject dealt with an effort by Fact magazine to smear the Republican nominee for President by a survey designed to solicit comments from psychiatrists regarding his mental stability. Today I wish to call attention to a second broadcast by Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr., on August 4 on the same network. In this broadcast Mr. Lewis points out the background of the publisher of Fact magazine. This background include his conviction on a charge of sending obscene material through the mails. The broadcast follows:

FACT MAGAZINE

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, this is Fulton Lewis, Jr., speaking from the Mutual studios in Washington, D.C. I'll have my news and views for you in just a moment.

Last night, ladies and gentlemen, I gave you a report on a project which has been undertaken by a new bimonthly magazine published in New York City under the title Fact, in circularizing—by their own statement—"a group of respected psychologists and psychiatrists" over the Nation with a questionnaire asking them the question:

"Do you think that BARRY GOLDWATER is psychologically fit to serve as President of the United States?"

The circular makes note of the fact that a recent survey by the reputable medical magazine Medical Tribune showed that while MD's generally are 2 to 1 in favor of Senator BARRY GOLDWATER for President, psychiatrists are 10 to 1 against him. It asked certain loaded questions such as "Does he seem prone to aggressive behavior and destructiveness? Does he seem callous to the downtrodden and needy? Can you offer any explanation of his public temper-tantrums and his occasional outbursts of profanity? Finally, do you think that his having had two nervous breakdowns has any bearing on his fitness to govern this country?"

I reported that Senator GOLDWATER has never had a nervous breakdown and that the Medical Tribune had informed me that 4 years ago the magazine had conducted an identical poll to its recent one, that time as between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, and that the results were that the MD's as a whole were 2 to 1 in favor of Nixon but the psychiatrists were 10 to 1 against him—the same proportions that came out of the present poll—and that inasmuch as there was never any question about the psychological fitness of Mr. Nixon 4 years ago, conclusion was that the political opinions of the psychiatrists must have been based on considerations other than psychological fitness.

Tonight, I want to go a little deeper into this picture and behind the scenes, somewhat and take a closer look at Fact magazine who is behind it.

On January 13 of this year, the United Press International carried an item under a New York City dateline, stating that a man named Ralph Ginzberg had announced the publication of a new bimonthly magazine, which would be sold for $1.25 per copy, and that he had ordered an original run of 100,000 copies for the first edition. And it quoted Mr. Ginzberg as stating that "in presenting the truth, we will not hesitate to offend big business, the church, the State, or even, if necessary, our readers."

Mr. Ginzberg is publisher of the magazine, and the owner and financial backer. The magazine accepts no advertising. They reported today that they have a net paid circulation of 200,000 at the present time.

Now, about Mr. Ginzberg's background.

He had three other publications in the past, one by the name Eros which was advertised as "A journal of erotica," another called Liason magazine and something called a Housewife's handbook of selective promiscuity.

The Post Office Department got on his trail on charges of sending obscene material through the mails and the case was presented to a Federal Grand Jury in Philadelphia which subsequently indicted him on the charges and he was brought to trial.

He waived a jury trial because, he says, he felt so confident of winning that he didn't want to go through the trouble and expense and time consumption of selecting a jury, and decided instead to stand trial before Judge Ralph C. Body.

Judge Body held the trial, considered the evidence and Ginzberg's defense, found him guilty and sentenced him to 5 years in Federal prison and $42,000 fine. He has since appealed the verdict, but as of the present time those two sentences stand against him.

Now one of the newspapers in New York City is the New York Post, probably the most extreme liberal newspaper in the United States, which has as its editorial-page editor and columnist the well-known James Weschler, who undertook to make some observations about Mr. Ginzberg's present questionnaire to the psychiatrists over the Nation, published last Thursday, and considering the source, I think you may be interested in hearing it. Mr. Weschler writes as follows:

"A new self-styled 'muckraking' magazine called Fact is privately circularizing psychiatrists and psychologists with this inquiry:

"Do you think that BARRY GOLDWATER is psychologically fit to serve as President of the United States?

Tribute to Morris Cafritz

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. AUGUST E. JOHANSEN
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 12, 1964

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Speaker, a distinguished Member of the other body, Hon. JENNINGS RANDOLPH, of West Virginia, a former Member of this House, has served on the board of the Metropolitan Police Boys' Club in the District of Columbia for nearly 20 years.

On Sunday, August 2, he delivered the principal address at the dedication of the Morris Cafritz Administration Building for the Boys' Club summer camp at Scotland, Md.

In this address, Senator RANDOLPH paid a richly merited tribute to the late Mr. Cafritz, an exceptionally fine, public-spirited citizen of Washington and a longtime supporter of the Metropolitan Police Boys' Club.

Under permission to extend my remarks, I include Senator RANDOLPH'S address:

Max Farrington, ladies and gentlemen, associates and members of the Metropolitan Police Boys' Club, and friends of our former coworker Morris Cafritz: It is a privilege for me to be with you this afternoon. We share in a memorial for a man who was close to the hearts of us all.

In the brief history of American democracy we have effectively demonstrated that the ultimate achievement or failure of our system will rest with the individual citizen. It is the shopkeeper, factory worker, farmer, housewife, and salesman who must, in the final analysis, bring strength, purpose, and direction.

As members of organizations or special interest groups, and in day-to-day living we exercise an influence on the thoughts and reactions of those we meet. Ours is the responsibility, therefore, to be informed. We must make every effort to be knowledgeable on the current issues and seek an understanding of our traditions and heritage. With this background we are prepared to make a more meaningful contribution to the molding of effective government and a wholesome society.

In addition to being informed and perhaps equally as important, is our responsibility to be active in the community process. It has been truly said that "faith without works is dead"—and all our wisdom and knowledge are of little value if we are apathetic. We are participants and not merely spectators. As American citizens we are the most important element in our Republic and not merely the fortunate recipients of its benefits. It is the dedication and integrity of each person that dictates what we are to accomplish. It is our challenge to overcome the temptation to sit silently and allow others to carry our burdens—to assume a passive part in the tasks of our democracy and to give only slight attention to its problems and programs. This is not the seed of success, or the environment from which have sprung the significant messages and movements of the past. Such indifference will spell failure in the age of space just as it would have in a bygone era.

The philosopher William James has said: "Be not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living and your belief will help create the fact."

Morris Cafritz believed that life was worth living. He was a doer, a participant in the American process, a leader in community, church, and business. His life was glowing proof that enlightened participation must be the cornerstone of positive citizenship.

From a modest beginning Morris Cafritz scaled the heights of achievement. He also knew the disappointments and sorrows which come to all men of deep conviction and he withstood them. He emerged as a public spirited leader who shared his counsel, his wealth, his abilities, and his honest efforts in furthering the public interest. His was a respected voice in civic affairs. He was a cherished friend of many Members of the U.S. Congress. He has incredibly helpful in carrying forward countless philanthropic projects. He maintained a position of eminence in his chosen professional field. And, through it all, he was a devoted husband, a loving father, a faithful friend.

These qualities of Morris Cafritz may be best expressed by another reference to William James. In a letter to his sister on the occasion of the purchase of a summer home Mr. James exclaimed with joy that it had "14 doors and they all open outward." Such was the world of Morris Cafritz—an open world of many doors, all opening out.

The Metropolitan Police Boys' Club was of primary interest to Mr. Cafritz and has known the forward thrust of his enthusiastic assistance. From 1940 to 1942 he served as president of the club and for approximately 26 years he worked actively as a member of the committee responsible for the administration of this camp.

Morris Cafritz believed in young people and he believed in the city of Washington. He served the best interests of both by supporting the camp and giving generously of his time and effort. It is fitting, therefore, that we give recognition to the accomplishment of this selfless man by dedicating in his memory the Morris Cafritz Administration Building.

I am grateful that I was blessed with the friendship of Morris Cafritz. This relationship, however, was not unique, for his comradeship with his fellow man was a constantly enlarging and happy circle. Those who gather today share a common joy that this circle included them.

Morris was a gentle and a good man. By the enduring qualities of life he was a truly great man.

Congressman Burton on the Poverty Bill

SPEECH
OF
HON. PHILLIP BURTON
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Saturday, August 8, 1964

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Speaker, I speak in support of President Johnson's war on poverty. This important legislation is a major step forward in the struggle to end poverty in America and to provide all our people with the means to achieve and enjoy a fuller life.

Of considerable interest to me is the formula by which funds under the various titles of the act will be allocated. In discussing this matter with the floor managers of the bill, including my distinguished colleague from California, Congressman JAMES ROOSEVELT, I have been assured that the data used for computing the number of public assistance recipients in the various States will be the latest available monthly figures.

The committee report made reference, as an illustration, to the number of public assistance recipients for January 1964. I was assured that later monthly figures than January 1964 would be used for the purpose of computing the number of monthly public assistance recipients and that January 1964 was merely the latest available month at the time that the committee report was compiled.

I have relied on this assurance that the latest monthly date will be used, because to do otherwise would most unfairly discriminate against California, whose program to extend aid to families with dependent children was not established until February 1964 and whose caseload in this connection has not yet stabilized.

Adopt a New Immigration Policy Now

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 12, 1964

Mr. RYAN of New York. Mr. Speaker, I wish to draw the attention of my colleagues to an editorial in yesterday's New York Times urging revision of the immigration law before the end of this session. I have introduced H.R. 7740 which would do so. The editorial is completely correct in pointing out "The United States will not fully have mounted its war against discrimination until it revises its unfair immigration law." Our present immigration law based on the national origin of this country's population in 1920 is indeed discriminatory and violates our democratic principles. I urge all my colleagues to read the following editorial:

[From the New York Times, Aug. 11, 1964]

A NEW IMMIGRATION POLICY

The United States will not fully have mounted its war against discrimination until it revises its unfair immigration law.

Immigration quotas are now assigned to each country on the basis of the national origin of this country's population as of 1920. This system was designed quite deliberately to give preference to immigration from northern Europe. But immigration from this area is never large enough to fill the assigned quotas. Since the vacancies cannot be transferred, the real effect of the system is to cut down immigration far below the authorized total and to shut the doors to many people from less favored lands.

As Attorney General Kennedy told Congress recently, this system is a source of global embarrassment to the United States. Other nations—especially those whose citizens are discriminated against—reject and resent the implication that they belong to "lesser breeds." Our rules keep out many scientists and others with special skills, talents and attainments this country needs. And they separate thousands of families of American citizens with close kin abroad.

This is, in short, a system that should be abolished, and President Johnson, like President Kennedy before him, is sponsoring a program to abolish it. There is no intention of raising the immigration total above the 165,000 a year now authorized—a small enough number for a nation approaching 200 million in population. And immigration from any one country would be limited to 10

thrust of Senator GOLDWATER's criticism has been blunted and the A–11, YF–12A, "SR–71," and supersonic transport research aircraft has scored its third political victory. Only two more to go to become a genuine ace.

We suspect that the next chapter in the checkered career of the A–11 will be the "revelation" at the most opportune political moment that it can be a bomber, too, thus eliminating any further need for development of the B–70, AMSS or any other type of advanced manned striking system.

For a new aircraft that is either 5 or 2 years old, depending on which television program you watched, the A–11 has had an amazingly versatile career. We wonder if Lockheed has the facilities to build as many of them as the Defense Department obviously will request.

APPALACHIAN FACTFINDING TOUR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. SCHWENGEL] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. SCHWENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, throughout the hearings of H.R. 11946, a bill to provide for Appalachian regional development, I repeatedly requested that the ad hoc Subcommittee on Appalachian Regional Development of the House Committee on Public Works make a tour of the region to gather firsthand knowledge of the situation and to hear from the people actually experiencing the conditions purported to exist in the testimony presented to us by many officials of the administration.

This is not an unusual request, since many members of the committee and of the Congress do make such trips, for the purpose of conducting hearings on other pieces of vital legislation. Nevertheless, even after continued assurances that the subcommittee leadership was seriously considering the proposal to make the trip, the bill was favorably reported from the committee without any factfinding trip being taken.

Because I believe so strongly in getting firsthand, grassroots information, last week I went to Martinsburg, W. Va., at my own expense to hear testimony from the residents of West Virginia, Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. I announced that I would be there to hear testimony about the Appalachian area and its problems through the press media, and when my assistants and I arrived there were some 22 people at the hearing room waiting to add their remarks to the knowledge already gathered on the legislation. Some 18 of these people gave testimony that morning. I intend to put this testimony in all or in part into the RECORD later this week or the first of next week.

To make this trip even more worth while, some farm leaders took me on a tour of the actual farming sections of the region during the afternoon. I visited several farms which are considered to be typical of the area.

For years I have been taking such trips throughout counties in my district to gather opinions from my constituents, and I have found such trips to be very beneficial. I knew Charles Toam, representing the Frederick County Fruit Growers, Winchester, Va., made the following remark:

We have endeavored for a number of years to obtain labor both out of West Virginia and southern parts of Virginia for our harvest. We are large users of Bahaman and Jamaican labor, because we have been unable to supply our needs for labor in this area from our local supply, in spite of the statements that there are many unemployed, and I don't doubt the truth of these statements. We have not been able to induce these people to leave home and to come into this area and pick our fruit. We feel that along with this there are several different items that bear greater consideration than at least we have heard there are considerations in the bill—one of them being a modification of our welfare programs. One that would induce people to work and encourage them to work, rather than to discourage them from working because of their inability to get back on a program or to pick up after work ceases to be available, particularly of a seasonable nature.

He went on to say:

We even had occasions where the public officials have discouraged them from working because they would deplete their rolls, and thereupon more or less put them (the public officials) out of a job.

I was accompanied on this trip by Randall Teague, minority clerk, Watersheds Development Subcommittee, House Committee on Public Works, and Allen Schimmel, legislative assistant, at my office. Both of them were very helpful. I would like to emphasize that this tour was unofficial and not a function of the Public Works Committee. The expenses for the tour came from my own pocket, and my only consideration was to get to the heart of this proposal—the people of Appalachia.

The testimony of the residents of Appalachia points out exactly what has been my original contention—that the blanket coverage of an entire section of the Nation by a bill of this nature is an unsound proposal. There are areas in Appalachia which need assistance, but blanket coverage to the entire region, parts of which are more prosperous than many other areas of the Nation, is not a correct approach. Just because someone at a drawing board outlined the geographical boundaries of the region, and some of the boundaries are very doubtful, does not mean that anyone or any place in that region should be able to receive Federal assistance.

I think that every Member of this body should examine the testimony which I will place in the RECORD later this week. It is indeed thought provoking, that such a trip to Appalachia would also be successful—there is no substitute for first-hand contact with the people. We must learn to hear from the people more often.

The people who came and appeared were indeed interested in the legislation concerning Appalachia. While most everyone was interested in the objectives of the program, not a single one actually endorsed the bill. Most of them expressed serious concern and skepticism over the feasibility and advisability of many proposals in the bill.

In discussing the preparation of the legislation by the President's Appalachian Regional Commission—PARC—and its report, we found that a very prominent authority on conservation matters with the State conservation committee was not even contacted specifically about the pasture improvement section of the bill, nor was he or others in that committee counciled about the other sections of the proposal. This leads us to believe that other State officials did not see the bill until it was already presented to the Congress by PARC. Since this program is supposedly a cooperative measure between the Federal Government and the State governments, this gave me some serious concern over the actual cooperation that existed in the preparation of this legislative proposal. If cooperation was nonexistent or minimal, then the cooperation which the bill envisages as existing between Federal and State authorities in the development and fulfillment of the programs of the Appalachian Regional Commission might also not come to full development. This would present some very serious problems. One thing to remember is that the Federal representative has a veto power over the plans of the Commission.

The people who testified in the Martinsburg hearings had some very good suggestions about the ways to handle the Appalachian problems and also about ways to handle such items there as unemployment, farm improvement, experimental farm stations, soil and water conservation, reducing beef surpluses, proper use of pesticides, ways to create incentive in the people of Appalachia, the exploitation of people of the area, and a host of other items, some germane and others not germane to the Appalachia bill. Some of these will be presented with the testimony placed in the RECORD.

Nevin A. Schall testifying in Martinsburg on behalf of the Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce stated:

The chamber believes that the useful portions of the Appalachian program can be implemented by existing Federal agencies. Creation of a new Federal commission, or a new Federal financing corporation, or any additional level of Federal bureaucracy is unnecessary and harmful. Additional governmental structures would not improve existing or proposed programs and would certainly cause Federal domination in essentially State and local affairs. Proper coordination of programs for the Appalachian region could be obtained simply and effectively by a Presidential assistant working with existing agencies.

He further stated:

The proposed agriculture program unwisely provides a substantial possibility of Federal subsidization of uneconomic land use and of perpetuation of the conditions intended to be remedied. The proposed Timber Development Organizations are objectionable because they are unnecessary and would create federally-subsidized competition with existing private organizations. * * * With reference to the mineral portions of the report, the chamber believes that technological advances creating a potential increase in the economic use of coal, by means of large-scale mine-mouth electric generating plants and extra-high voltage long-distance transmission lines, are already being fully utilized by the investor-owned electric companies. Hence, it believes that

the 1960 display was done after adjournment of the Congress despite the mandate of the House of Representatives—vote 381 to 12—in opposition.

Fourth. Both neglect to describe how Panamanian mobs invaded the Canal Zone, killing our soldiers, endangering the lives of our citizens, destroying property, and threatening canal installations and security of transit.

Fifth. Both attempt, in cowardly manner, to place the blame for the Red-led Panamanian mob assaults on 17-year old Balboa High School students.

Sixth. Spanish language versions of this hostile propaganda, printed by the Panama Canal organization under the title, "El Asunto de la Bandera," were given wide distribution in Latin America by Panamanians.

Imagine, Mr. Speaker, my shock when later learning that the original draft of "The Flag Issue," prepared by the regular Panama Canal staff after painstaking and time-consuming effort, was destroyed. Moreover, it appears that a managed news account, worked up by an agent of the Department of State in the office of the Governor of the Canal Zone, was the version published in the January 27 Spillway and the basis for the State Department's describing the summary as having been prepared in the Governor's office. The typed copy supplied me by the Department of State, which I promptly challenged, was described by that agency on February 18 as "an accurate account of events of January 9–12, in Panama."

Mr. Speaker, such misleading audacity in obscuring facts is alien to innate American character. The truth is that the Canal Zone, as the key target of Red attacks, was the principal scene of violence and disorder; not Panama. This alone is enough to remove any pretense of the article as an "accurate account." Moreover, it reveals the predilection of its framers and their superiors toward describing this territorial possession of the United States, known as the Canal Zone, as part of Panama.

No wonder, Mr. Speaker, my reluctant correspondents in the Department of State have been evasive and ambiguous in replies to my queries. They well know that the truth about their failures to act in the protection of our just and indispensable sovereign rights, power and authority in the Canal Zone would bring about universal condemnation by our people. Moreover, many of our loyal citizens throughout the Nation are demanding a full inquiry by the Congress into the conduct of Panama Canal policies with punitive actions against those guilty of the betrayals and criminal stupidity.

In the light of such outrageous proceedings, is it not pertinent to inquire when only Americans will be on guard in the vital positions involved?

A COALITION CANAL ZONE GOVERNMENT NO SOLUTION

Mr. Speaker, diplomatic discusions between the United States and Panama are now getting underway. Like the Communists under Lenin, Panamanian radicals have disdained to conceal their aims and have loudly proclaimed their ultimate objective for complete and unconditional sovereignty over the Canal Zone territory and Panama Canal. Among their immediate purposes, supported by suspect elements in our Government, are jurisdiction over the Thatcher Ferry Bridge at Balboa, its approaches, and connecting highways; and the employment of alien Panamanians as members of the Canal Zone Police Force, which body is charged with responsibilities in protecting the canal.

In remarks to the House on May 26, 1964, I stressed the importance of retaining full and complete U.S. control over the indicated bridge and its connections, and opposed cession of any corridors across the Canal Zone at any place. It is self evident, Mr. Speaker, that jurisdiction by Panama over bridges and corridors will result in the zone territory being instantly affected by all future revolutions in Panama, the frequency and violence of which are expected to increase rather than diminish. Moreover, such control by Panama would facilitate the imposition of vehicular tolls over the toll-free bridge, and this predatory objective is now being discussed in high Panamanian circles as a convenient method for extorting additional revenue from the United States.

Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding the obvious fact that such alien control of the new bridge at Balboa across the Pacific entrance channel and corridors through the zone would hamper the proper operation and protection of the Panama Canal, there are some in the United States as well as in Panama who constantly harp on the idea that the passage of 60 years has changed the overall aspects involved in the control, management, operation, and protection of the vital waterway; and that, therefore, the authority of the United States should be substantially liquidated and that Panama should fill the vacuum thus created.

As to such contention, Mr. Speaker, there could be no greater fallacy. Major developments during the past few years in modern weapons and "peaceful" methods of warfare through infiltration, subversion, and terror, have absolutely increased the necessity for retention by the United States of its full rights, power, and authority over the Canal Zone and Panama Canal as provided in the 1903 Treaty and for a wider Canal Zone. Among the reasons for this is the fact that the nuclear age constitutes an infinitely greater danger than did the naval gunfire of 60 years ago, when the treaty was promulgated. Indeed, instead of surrendering any of the Canal Zone territory to Panama, the width of the zone should be extended to include the entire watershed of the Chagres River.

These grim and realistic facts, Mr. Speaker, should always be kept in mind by the treatymaking powers of both Panama and the United States. What do our experienced military and naval leaders have to say about proposals for the surrender of corridors across the Canal Zone?—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 26, 1964, page A2778.

As to hiring alien Panamanians as members of the Canal Zone police force, this proposal conforms to the pretakeover tactics of the Red conspiracy and should be denounced as "tantamount to treason."—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 9, 1964, page 4545.

Mr. Speaker, Panama has no obligation under treaty to maintain, operate, sanitate, or protect the Panama Canal. This obligation is vested in the United States alone. Thus, it is indispensable that only U.S. citizens be chosen for all security positions. Such a practice is not anti-Panama or anti-Latin America but one of good sense and the best guarantee for security. Any relaxation in this regard will inevitably lead to the employment of those who will infiltrate the ranks of security positions for destructive purposes.

When the picture of events in the Canal Zone since the initial display in September 1960 of the Panama flag in equal dignity with the flag of the United States, and as recently disclosed by alarming reports from the Zone and Panama, is evaluated, the trend is unmistakable—the formation of a "coalition" Canal Zone Government.

This sinister objective was, in effect, revealed by the determined opposition on the part of loyal members of the Canal Zone police to the hiring of alien Panamanians in this protective force as a serious breach of security.

Mr. Speaker, in the light of modern history, such "coalition" government for the Panama Canal would be fatal, for it would not provide a solution but could only result in confusion and chaos, with our complete abandonment of the Panama Canal. The cases of China, Cuba and many others could be cited as ample warnings of the dangers of "coalition" governments. Moreover, it would bring about unsolvable extraterritorial problems which Theodore Roosevelt and the statesmen of his day sought to prevent forever.

While it may be contended that the plan to hire Panamanians as police has been shelved, the Congress should not be beguiled by such delaying tactics. At this moment, the Panama Canal legal organization is working on plausible amendments to the Canal Zone code to cover such employment, despite the clear intent of the Congress that only U.S. citizens shall be members of forces charged with the protection of the Canal Zone and Panama Canal.

To show the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the Canal Zone police and other security positions, there is the case of a Panamanian who, though a Panama Canal terminal security guard, joined the rioters in January and engaged in sniping into the Canal Zone. He was identified as one Edgar Harrison and, I understand, that an agency of our Government has a film showing him in the act of shooting into the Canal Zone during the riots. Why, I ask, has such information been withheld from our people?

Certainly, Mr. Speaker, such revelations as have been previously documented in many addresses to the Congress are adequate grounds for making major investigations of all aspects of the conduct of Panama Canal policy.

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Remarks: Attached are excerpts from the Congressional Record of 12 August containing the remarks of Representative Laird and Representative Gubser on the floor of the House concerning the A-11 and SR-71 aircraft.

STAT

Assistant Legislative Counsel

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